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    Abstract  
 
During the recent economic recession, firms have been less willing to invest 
in innovation, which often is an uncertain and long-term process. This 
reduction did not occur equally for all firms, and recent literature has analysed 
the characteristics of those firms which maintain or even raise their innovative 
efforts during the crisis. Technological collaboration has been recognised as 
one of the most important external sources that affects innovation 
performance. However, how economic recession has changed the impact of 
R&D collaboration on innovation performance has received few attention. This 
paper investigates the effect of different external cooperation patterns of firms 
before and during the last economic recession. We highlight the role of 
geographical and organizational diversity of knowledge sources, as well as 
the effect of past experience. We find that R&D cooperation has a stronger 
effect on radical innovation performance during the economic recession than 
before, this being true irrespectively of the geographical location of the 
partners. This benefit from cooperation during the economic turmoil is higher 
in the case of firms having a diverse portfolio of partners. In addition, we also 
find that past experience in R&D cooperation positively affects innovation 
performance during the crisis.   
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1 Introduction 
During economic recessions, firms face a major decrease in demand, financial 
constraints, and uncertainty about future market opportunities. These conditions might 
induce firms to reduce their investments in innovation; as a consequence, their 
innovation output could be negatively affected (OECD, 2009). At the same time, the 
economic turmoil could offer new learning opportunities (Chesbrough and Garman, 
2009). Within this scenario, R&D cooperation – which is one of the means the firms use 
to purse innovation (Tether, 2002) – could either become less important for achieving 
innovation performance during the crisis or alternatively could offer new opportunities 
to cope with the challenges of the crisis. While several studies have investigated the 
effects of economic crises on R&D expenditures (Archibugi et al., 2013a, 2013b; 
Cincera et al., 2012) and innovation output (Madrid-Guijarro et al., 2013), little is 
known about how the crisis has affected R&D cooperation and its impact on innovation 
performance.  
The relation between business cycles and innovation is far from consensus. The 
countercyclical approach proposes that during recessions innovation increases as, with 
low demand, the opportunity costs of doing innovation is higher than in periods of 
growth (Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998; Schumpeter, 1939). Alternatively, the procyclical 
approach points out that financial constraints might prohibit the firms to maintain or 
increase their R&D budget (Stiglitz, 1993) and that firms postpone innovation to 
periods of expansions to maximize the returns (Barlevy, 2004). Strategy literature has 
stressed the idea that learning is a crucial capacity of the firm (Kogut and Zander, 1992) 
and under changing external environmental firms react by adapting their learning 
process (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; March, 1991; Posen and Levinthal, 2012). In 
particular, in turbulent times firms might opt for an exploration strategy (e.g. more 
search, experimentation and risk taking) (March, 1991), of which R&D cooperation is a 
possible means (Koza and Lewin, 1998). Therefore, R&D cooperation could offer 
learning opportunities even during a turbulent time such as an economic recession, and 
can constitute a specific strategy to face economic crises.  
 The empirical evidence of the effects of the economic crisis on innovative 
investments is mostly supporting the procyclical arguments (Archibugi et al., 2013a, 
2013b; Cincera et al., 2012; Madrid-Guijarro et al., 2013; OECD, 2009; Paunov, 2012). 
Some of these scholars have explored the characteristics of firms that have increased 
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their innovative investments during the crisis, showing that recessions do not hit all 
firms equally and that some strategies could help to face a turbulent climate. Among 
other characteristics, an explorative behaviour (e.g. searching for new market 
opportunities) has been found correlated to increasing innovation during the economic 
recession (Archibugi et al., 2013a, 2013b).  
By drawing on the literature on business cycle and innovation (Aghion and Saint-
Paul, 1998; Barlevy, 2004), and the strategy literature that has explored how firms adapt 
their learning processes to a changing scenario (March, 1991; Posen and Levinthal, 
2012), this paper explores whether R&D cooperation helps to improve innovation 
performance during an economic recession. R&D collaboration with external partners 
has been recognized as an important determinant of firms’ innovation performance 
(Becker and Dietz, 2004; Nieto and Santamaría, 2007). We expect that, when facing 
turbulence, an exploration strategy such as R&D cooperation results as a successful 
strategy to adapt to face turbulent times by acquiring new knowledge that is far from 
existing knowledge stock (March, 1991; Posen and Levinthal, 2012). This can be 
especially true in the case of innovation that incorporates a high level of innovativeness 
such as radical-innovative products, for which external and diversified sources may 
imply knowledge that differs significantly from the one already present in the firm. 
We use data from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel for the period 
2004–2013, which contains information on the innovative and cooperative behaviour of 
Spanish firms. We estimate a two-stage selection model (Wooldridge, 1995). In the 
first-stage selection equation, the dependent variable indicates whether or not the firm 
has invested in innovation. The second stage of the analysis estimates the effects of 
collaboration on innovative performance. For the purpose of our analysis, we compare 
these effects before and after the crisis. We assess not only the impact of any type of 
R&D cooperation, but we also qualify R&D collaboration along two dimensions: 
geographical (i.e. exclusively-national versus international partners), and organizational 
(i.e. whether the firm collaborates only with one type of partners or with multiple ones). 
In addition, we investigate the impact of past experience in R&D collaboration in the 
during-crisis years.   
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on innovation 
and economic crisis, and on the effect of R&D cooperation on innovation performance. 
The data and the model are presented in Section 3 and a descriptive analysis is provided 
 3 
 
in Section 4. Econometric results are examined in section 5. Finally, Section 6 draws 
some conclusions. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 R&D cooperation during economic crises 
The relation between business cycles and innovation could be countercyclical or 
procyclical (Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998; Barlevy, 2004; Geroski and Walters, 1995; 
Stiglitz, 1993). The countercyclical approach relies on the Schumpterian perspective 
(Schumpeter, 1939) that in recessions innovation increases as firms would focus more 
on productivity-enhancing activities, and less on production activities because demand 
is low. Since production and R&D compete for resources, decreasing growth rates could 
be a good moment to devote more resources to R&D; hence, the incentive of carrying 
out innovation during recessions is higher than in periods of growing demand (Aghion 
and Saint-Paul, 1998). Alternatively, the procyclical approach debates that there are 
adverse conditions that inhibit the firms from maintaining or increasing their innovation 
efforts during recessions. One of the reasons is that recessions cause financial 
constraints, in terms of cash flows to devote to R&D and access to external financing to 
support R&D (Stiglitz, 1993). Another reason is that since the returns from innovation 
have a short time span (namely, until competitors learn how to imitate the successful 
new products), firms postpone the investments in innovation to periods of expansions to 
maximize the benefits (Barlevy, 2004).   
Strategy literature has related changing external environments to the learning 
processes that the firms activate in order to survive, namely an explorative or 
exploitative approach (Koza and Lewin, 1998; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Levinthal 
and March, 1993; March, 1991; Posen and Levinthal, 2012). Exploration implies 
search, discovery, experimentation, variation, flexibility, risk taking and innovation. 
Exploitation implies refinement, implementation, efficiency, choice, selection and 
production (March, 1991). A key difference between stable and turbulent environments 
is the relative role of explorative and exploitative learning (Levinthal and March, 1993; 
March, 1991). When facing turbulence, an exploration strategy is necessary to adapt to a 
changing environment and to acquire new knowledge that is far from the existing 
knowledge stock (March, 1991; Posen and Levinthal, 2012). This applies not without 
caveats. Too much focus on new knowledge may lead to too many underdeveloped 
ideas (March, 1991), and rewards to exploration can be eroded by ongoing turbulence, 
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as the new knowledge accumulated during the changing environments can have short-
term applications (Posen and Levinthal, 2012). Although both exploration and 
exploitation can be performed on internal as well as on external knowledge sources, 
exploration activities rely more heavily on external knowledge (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001). R&D collaboration are explorative in nature, while other types of alliances 
(marketing alliances, or supplying alliances) are exploitative (Koza and Lewin, 1998). 
Hence, R&D cooperation could offer learning opportunities even during a turbulent 
time such as economic recessions, and can constitute a specific strategy to face the 
challenges of an economic crisis.  
In particular, during economic recessions, firms could address their resources to 
explore new markets and technological fields (Archibugi et al., 2013a) through external 
collaborations and to upgrade the skills of the R&D workforce through contacts with 
external specialists (Barrett et al., 2009). Since market turbulence increases the 
uncertainty of doing innovation, R&D cooperation could offer a channel to increase the 
variety of knowledge sources (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003) and help the firms to 
monitor new opportunities that might arise in the near future (Archibugi et al., 2013a), 
as focusing solely on the exploitation of existing knowledge can damage the long-term 
capacities of a firm “to grow beyond its core business” (Chesbrough and Garman, 2009, 
p. 1). R&D cooperation could also relieve the financial pressures (Cincera et al., 2012), 
because it allows firms to share the costs and risks of doing innovation and it may allow 
the firms to access to resources from partners in a better financial situation (e.g. private 
institutions, large corporations, or firms in fast-growing markets less affected by the 
recession). In these veins, Schwartz et al. (2012) find that cooperation with large firms 
is beneficial to innovation output in different types of subsidized R&D agreements. 
The empirical evidence of the effects of economic crises on overall innovative 
efforts is mostly supporting the procyclical arguments (Archibugi et al., 2013a, 2013b; 
Cincera et al., 2012; Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011; Madrid-Guijarro et al., 2013; 
OECD, 2009; Paunov, 2012). Some of these studies detect an explorative attitude in the 
firms that have increased their innovative investments during the last recession. Using 
the UK innovation survey, Archibugi et al. (2013b) find that pursing an explorative 
strategy (e.g. looking at new markets) positively affects the increase in innovation 
investments during the crisis. Similarly, using a survey on 29 European countries, 
Archibugi et al. (2013a) shows that the small sample of firms (i.e. 9%) that declared to 
have increased innovation expenditures during the crisis (which is, from the end of 2008 
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to early 2009) are path-breakers and have a more explorative behaviour; in particular 
they are: “i) smaller than before; ii) collaborating with other businesses; iii) exploring 
new market opportunities; iv) using methods of technological appropriation; and v) less 
likely to compete on costs.” (p. 1259). Using the survey of companies of the EU 
Scoreboard about expectations on their R&D activities, Cincera et al. (2012) find that 
firms with high profitability in 2008 declare their wish to increase R&D investments 
both before and during the crisis, which suggests that when not under financial 
constraints (i.e. high profitability provides cash to maintain or increase R&D 
expenditure) firms increase R&D expenditures. For Spanish SMEs, Madrid-Guijarro et 
al. (2013) find a strong relation between innovation and overall performance also during 
the crisis, suggesting that firms’ commitment to innovation in turbulent times is an 
important driver of competitive advantage.  
However, as far as our knowledge is concerned, the effects of economic 
recessions on the relations between R&D cooperation and innovation performance has 
not been studied. We expect that, despite the general level of R&D cooperation could 
have decreased during the last economic recession (i.e. R&D cooperation is pro-
cyclical) as suggested by studies on overall innovation investments (Cincera et al., 
2012; Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011; OECD, 2009), the firms which managed to be 
innovative have used R&D cooperation as an exploration strategy to cope with the 
crisis. Therefore, the effects of R&D cooperation on innovation performance during the 
last economic recession would be stronger than during the expansion, suggesting that 
the most innovative firms during economic recessions benefit from technological 
cooperation with external partners to a larger extent than in expansion times.  
In the following sections, we discuss how economic recessions may impact the 
relations between innovation performance and various forms of R&D cooperation, as 
investigated by recent literature. In particular, existing studies have taken into account  
the geographical location of partners (Badillo and Moreno, 2015; Nieto and Santamaría, 
2007; van Beers and Zand, 2014), the type of cooperating partners (Belderbos et al., 
2004; Duysters and Lokshin, 2011), and the time-dimension of collaboration (Belderbos 
et al., 2015; Nieto and Santamaría, 2007). 
 
2.2 The geography of R&D cooperation during economic crises 
During an economic downturn, focusing solely on national partners can offer an 
exploration strategy with relatively lower risks, as firms move outside their boundaries 
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but within their National Systems of Innovation (NSI) (Cantwell, 1989; Lundvall, 1992; 
Porter, 1990). National firms share the same problems and difficulties within a NSI, and 
solutions from foreign countries might not be applicable. As a consequence, national 
R&D collaboration could offer the possibility to share the costs of exploring 
opportunities under a common changing environment.  
In contrast to national R&D cooperation, international R&D partners offer new 
learning opportunities not or scarcely available nationally, which eventually boost 
innovation performance (Arvanitis and Bolli, 2013; Badillo and Moreno, 2015; Frenz 
and Ietto-Gillies, 2009; Lavie and Miller, 2008; van Beers and Zand, 2014). Having 
cooperation agreements with international partners provide a wide knowledge and 
multiple communication channels that the firms are particularly willing to use during a 
recession. Firstly, international R&D cooperation can be a way to diversify the risk and 
escape the lock-in knowledge traps of own NSI, as partners reflect the technological 
strength and specialization of their home country NSI (Lundvall, 1992). Indeed, firms 
that count only on their home national innovation system can be more vulnerable when 
a recession hits the country. Secondly, in a period of low demand, international R&D 
cooperation could help to purse an exploration strategy in new or related technological 
fields, which are more likely to be found in foreign NSI. Thirdly, when under financial 
constraints, firms may have better chances to share costs when the partner is 
international, either because the crisis hits NSI differently (some foreign countries had 
the resources to continue to support business R&D, see e.g. Hud and Hussinger (2015) 
about Germany) or because some large players operating at the international level might 
be less affected from a decrease of cash flows.  
 
2.3 R&D cooperation and the diversity of partners during economic recessions 
Firms collaborate with different type of actors (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). R&D 
collaborations with suppliers and clients provide vital information on technologies, 
markets and user’s needs (Zeng et al., 2010). Horizontal cooperation is used to share the 
costs and risks of setting a standard technology or to comply to a new regulation 
(Tether, 2002). R&D collaboration with institutions usually involve low risk of 
knowledge leakage and it has increasingly become a crucial means to access to new 
scientific, basic, pre-competitive knowledge (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003), as it has 
increased over time for the incentive by governments to fund research oriented to 
increase competiveness of firms (Nieto and Santamaría, 2007). 
 7 
 
Despite the fact that the choice of each type of partner depends on the strategy and 
resources of the firms, having multiple types of partners has been found to have a 
positive effect on innovation performance (Becker and Dietz, 2004; Nieto and 
Santamaría, 2007; van Beers and Zand, 2014). Indeed, a diversity of external sources of 
knowledge spurs synergies and novel associations and exposes the firm to skills and 
expertise from different technological fields (Chesbrough, 2003; Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Laursen and Salter, 2006). Eventually, the firm relying on multiple types of 
cooperation partners increases its capacities to create innovative products.  
In time of economic turmoil, firms might avoid having a broad network of 
partners, since too much openness could become costly and inefficient for the firm 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006). Indeed, it has been observed that firms which innovate 
mainly through collaboration with others tend to have fewer variety of partners (Barge-
Gil, 2010), as some benefits arise from focusing on a single type of partners, such as the 
development of certain routines that facilitate knowledge exchange (Belderbos et al., 
2015). However, the benefits of relying on a variety of sources could be higher than the 
ones from having a single type of partners, especially during a crisis because among a 
higher diversity of external knowledge the chances to find channels allowing firms to 
broaden the pool of technological opportunities are higher. This way, in an economic 
crisis, using a wide range of external actors allows the firm to have a broader spectrum 
of experiences with diverse partners that in some instances can be living the crisis 
differently, allowing for wider knowledge than collaboration with only one type of 
partner. Hence, the diversity in the type of partners should spur innovation performance 
more intensively during economic crises.  
In addition, if these partners are international, the combination of organizational 
and geographical diversity should reinforce the effects on innovation performance. In 
this case, not only firms benefit from specialized knowledge coming from different 
types of partners, but also they are able to access to different knowledge bases in foreign 
NSI, as discussed in Section 2.2.  
 
2.4 The importance of time: continuity and persistence in R&D cooperation 
Previous experience in technological cooperation might help the firms in different 
ways (Belderbos et al., 2015; Nieto and Santamaría, 2007; Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2006). Firstly, as a firm’s current innovation capabilities are determined by its history 
and experience, having participated in technological collaborations determine current 
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innovation capabilities (Nieto and Santamaría, 2007). Secondly, previous experience in 
R&D cooperation provides the firms with the necessary managerial capabilities to deal 
with alliances (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006), as well as to build up reputation and trust 
among partners (Nieto and Santamaría, 2007). Thirdly, repeated and extended 
collaborations might provide the necessary incubation time before new R&D 
collaborations start to have an effect on firm’s innovation performance  (Belderbos et 
al., 2015).  
If the repeated collaboration regards the same partner, reputation and trust 
between partners could offer a channel to access more quickly or more effectively to 
knowledge on markets. Then, if the repeated collaboration regards the same type of 
partners (e.g. suppliers, clients, competitors, institutions), the firms could have 
developed some mutual routines and capabilities to deal with problems, which during an 
economic turmoil can constitute an advantage towards firms that have not a history of 
accessing to external sources of knowledge.  
The literature on the patterns of the previous experience in R&D collaboration has 
highlighted that the quantity of collaboration done in the past is only a part of the story. 
Indeed, high levels of alliance activity have diminishing returns (Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2006; Sampson, 2005). One possible explanation for this is that only the most recent 
experience offers lessons, especially under changing external environments (Samson 
2005). In addition to that, Belderbos et al. (2015) find that it is mostly persistent and 
recent collaborations (i.e. in two previous consecutive years) which are important for 
innovation performance.  
Although the most recent experience offers the most valuable knowledge, the 
firms that have pursued an explorative behaviour under different business climates 
could benefit of a variety of knowledge. Indeed, as the external knowledge acquired 
during a certain period becomes part of the current knowledge stock of firms, the 
combination of past external knowledge and current external knowledge could boost 
new innovative ideas (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Accordingly, firms which have 
cooperated both before and during the crisis may have higher innovative performance 
than firms that have cooperative agreements only before or only during the crisis. 
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3 Data and the model 
3.1 Data 
Our empirical analysis uses data from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel 
(PITEC)1 from 2004 to 2013. The survey is carried out by the Spanish National 
Statistics Institute (INE), the Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology 
(FECYT), and the Foundation for Technical Innovation (COTEC). Participation in 
PITEC survey is mandatory by law which ensures a large and consistent sample size 
and a high response rate; however, some firms are not observed for the entire period 
given the partially random sampling for small enterprises (Belderbos et al., 2015). The 
survey follows the Oslo Manual methodology applied in the Community Innovation 
Survey with respect to the selection of variables and indicators (OECD, 2005).  
Our initial unbalanced sample includes 85755 observations, with represents 10917 
manufacturing and service firms with at least ten employees and positive sales, and 
which did not report any significant event that would impact employment. This sample 
constitutes 85% of total firms surveyed in 2004-2013 in PITEC. Since this sample 
decreases over time because some firms may report a major issue2, we test our 
predictions on a balanced panel of firms that are present during the whole period 2005-
20133. This balanced panel comprises 53595 observations, representing 5955 firms.  
 
3.2 The model 
We follow a two-stage approach to address the potential selection bias on the 
estimation of the innovation performance equation. The first stage consists of a binary 
selection model using all sample observations and considering as dependent variable 
whether the firm has carried out innovation activities4 and 0 otherwise (d). The second 
stage consists in the estimation of the innovation performance equation, the dependent 
variable being innovative performance (y), taking explicit account of the selection 
process.  
The specification of the model is as follows: 
                                                 
1 This database is available at http://icono.fecyt.es/PITEC    
2 Possible issues reported are: firms belonging to a sector with high employment turnover; acquired firm; change in the unit of 
reference; change or abandonment of activity; firm remaining of an acquisition process (not part of the acquisition); in liquidation; 
merged; firm which has employees ceded by other firms; consequence of the crisis; firm which cedes employees to other firms. 
3 The sample size in 2004 is lower than 2005 and subsequent years. Hence, imposing the restriction of the balanced panel to firms 
present in 2004-2013 would have left out new firms entering in 2005 and staying for the remaining years.  
4
 These activities include: internal R&D; external R&D, acquisition of machinery, equipment and software; acquisition of other 
external knowledge; training; market introduction of innovations; other preparations. 
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𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 1[𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 > 0]  (1) 
 
y
it
= {
xitβ+αi+εit   if dit=1
0                  if dit=0
  (2) 
 
with i = 1, …, N, t = 1, …, T, and 1[.] an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if 
the expression between square brackets is true and 0 otherwise; γ and β are unknown 
parameter vectors to be estimated and zit and xit are vectors of explanatory variables 
with possibly common elements. Valid exclusion restrictions are assumed in equation 
(2). ηi and αi are unobserved individual specific effects which may be correlated with zit 
and xit, respectively; and uit and εit the idiosyncratic errors. The innovation performance 
variable (yit) is only observable if the firm made an innovative investment (dit=1) and 
the parameter vector of interest to estimate is β. 
We use the Wooldridge’s (1995) consistent estimator for panel data with sample 
selection. First, we consistently estimate β by estimating a probit of di on zi for each t 
and then saving the inverse Mills ratio, ?̂?𝑖𝑡. Second, the method estimates by pooled 
OLS the equation of interest augmented by the inverse Mills ratio and the means of the 
time-varying explanatory variables (xi) using the selected sample.
5 The resulting 
equation is (Wooldridge, 2010):  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑥𝑖𝜓 + ∑ 𝜌𝑡𝐷𝑡?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   for all dit=1 (3) 
 
where Dt is a time indicator variable.  
In order to compare the cooperation behaviour before and during the crisis, we 
firstly estimate Eq. (3) for the whole period, with 1-year lag of time-variant regressors, 
both for the unbalanced (t = 2004, …, 2013) and balanced panels (t = 2005, …, 2013). 
Secondly, we run Eq. (3) for the pre-crisis years (t = 2005, …, 2010), and for the 
during-crisis years (t = 2011, …, 2013) for the balanced panel to ensure comparability. 
These time frames build on the fact that the real economy was hit by the crisis in 2009 
(European Commission, 2015; Hud and Hussinger, 2015; Keeley and Love, 2010) and 
that our cooperation variables refers to cooperation behaviour in the survey year t and in 
                                                 
5 We assume that the conditional mean of the individual effects are a linear projection on the within individual means of the time-
variant regressors (Mundlak, 1978; Nijman and Verbeek, 1992; Wooldridge, 1995; Zabel, 1992).  
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the previous two years.6 Hence, estimating the dependent variable in 2011 on 1-year lag 
cooperation means that we are considering cooperation behaviour in 2010, 2009, and 
2008, meaning that in the “during crisis” estimation we allow for cooperation only in 
one possible year of overlapping with the pre-crisis period (i.e. 2008). Accordingly, 
estimating the dependent variable in 2010 on 1-year lag cooperation means that we are 
considering cooperation behaviour in 2009, 2008, and 2007, meaning that in the “pre-
crisis” estimation, we allow for cooperation only in one possible year of overlapping 
with the during-crisis period (i.e. 2009). There is no other overlapping in the rest of the 
years under consideration.  
 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
In the first stage, the dependent variable is a binary indicator, equal to 1 if the firm 
has been engaged in any innovation activity in t. In the second stage, the dependent 
variable is innovation performance, defined as the share of sales in t due to new or 
significantly improved products that constitute a novelty for the firm (new 
incrementally-innovative products) or to the market (new radically-innovative 
products), introduced in the survey year or in the previous two years. New-to-the-
market products can be seen as more “radical” innovation since they push the 
technological frontier in the industry (Belderbos et al., 2015; Tödtling et al., 2009). We 
transform these shares as the ratio between the ratio of new sales on total sales and the 
complement to 1 of this latter ratio, and then transformed in logarithm. This measure 
has the advantage of being closer to a normal distribution and being symmetric (Barge-
Gil, 2013; Raymond et al., 2010; Robin and Schubert, 2013).  
3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
In the first stage, building on an established literature on the determinants of 
innovation, we control for firm size (size) and we also introduce its squared term (size  
2) to take into account nonlinearities (Robin and Schubert, 2013); in addition, we insert 
the market share of the firm and whether the firm belongs to a group (Raymond et al., 
2010; Vega-Jurado et al., 2009; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). We also introduce 
barriers to innovation by means of four Likert-type variables: cost obstacles, knowledge 
obstacles, market obstacles, and other obstacles. We allow a time lag of one year for all 
                                                 
6 The specific question in the questionnaire is as follows (example for the 2013 edition): “In the period 2011-2013, did your 
enterprise cooperate in any of its innovation activities with other enterprises or institutions?” 
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explanatory variables. The variables group, and the four variables related to the 
obstacles to innovation are considered as exclusion restrictions for the second stage, 
meaning that they are likely to influence on the decision to carry out innovation 
activities, but are not determinants of innovation performance. Finally, industry 
dummies are introduced at 2-digits CNAE-2009 classification.   
In the second stage, the key explanatory variable is cooperation, which takes the 
value 1 if the firm declares to have undertook innovative activities with other 
enterprises or entities (external or from the same-group) in the survey year and the two 
previous years7. We qualify cooperation along two dimensions, geographical (i.e. the 
home-country of the partner) and organizational (i.e. the type of partner). We construct 
the variable national only, which is equal to 1 if the firm declares to have collaborated 
only with national partners, 0 otherwise; in addition, we build the variable international, 
which is equal to 1 if the firm declares to have collaborated at least with an international 
partner.  
By using the information on the type of partners, we identify three typologies: 
vertical (i.e. suppliers and clients), horizontal (i.e. with competitors or other firms in the 
same branch of activity), and institutional (i.e. university, private and public research 
centres, institutes, laboratories, consultants, or technological centres). We firstly 
identify the firms that cooperate exclusively with firms that belong to the same group 
and are in the same country (national only+same group only). Then, we identify the 
firms that were collaborating only with a type of national partner not from the same 
corporate group (henceforth, external)8: national only+vertical only, national 
only+horizontal only, and national only+institutional only. In addition, we introduce 
national only+multipartners, which takes the value 1 if the firm is cooperating with at 
least two different types of national external partners. As far as the international 
collaboration is concerned, we firstly identify the firms that cooperate exclusively with 
firms in the same group in foreign countries and, if it is the case, also nationally 
(international+same group only). Then, we build a set of variables controlling for 
whether the firms were collaborating only with one type of external partner 
internationally and, if it is the case, also nationally: international+vertical only, 
international+horizontal only, and international+institutional only. In addition, we 
                                                 
7 This cooperation does not require that the parts achieve a commercial benefit and it excludes subcontracting without active 
cooperation.  
8 Note that these firms may also have national or international cooperation with same-group firms.  
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introduce the variable international+multipartners, which is equal to 1 if the firm is 
collaborating with at least two different external partners, at least one of which is 
located abroad. Finally, although we are not interested in isolating the effects of 
cooperating with firms in the same group, we introduce a control that accounts for those 
firms that collaborate only with firms from the same group (internationally, and/or 
nationally) (same group only) 9. 
As long as the intertemporal dimension is concerned, we construct the variable 
continuity which counts the number of years of cooperative behaviour up to t-1 (Nieto 
and Santamaría, 2007). We also create three dummy variables, indicating whether the 
firm declares R&D collaboration in t-1 and before the crisis (in 2005-2008) (persistent 
cooperation), only during but not before (during crisis cooperation), and only before 
the crisis (before crisis cooperation).  
For the second-stage step, additional controls are size, its square term and market 
share (Raymond et al., 2010; Vega-Jurado et al., 2009; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). 
In addition, we introduce the share of internal R&D expenditures over total sales (in-
house R&D intensity) as a proxy for a firm’s absorptive capacity (Becker and Dietz, 
2004), foreign ownership (Nieto and Santamaría, 2010), whether the firm conducted 
internal R&D activities continuously (permanent R&D) (Raymond et al., 2010), the 
degree of openness (Laursen and Salter, 2006), the importance of demand-pull factors 
(Raymond et al., 2010), the international market scope as declared by firms (Cassiman 
and Veugelers, 2006; Nieto and Santamaría, 2007), and whether it was a new firm in 
2004 or in 2005 (Archibugi et al., 2013b). A set of 2-digit industry dummies is 
introduced.  
The control variables are measured on annual base, with the exception of 
openness, demand-pull, international market, and new firm which instead refer to the 
year of the survey t and the two previous years. The appendix provides more details on 
                                                 
9 For the geographical dimension, we do not distinguish between collaboration with firms in the same group or not from the same 
group, since we are interested in the capacity of the firm to undertake relations at different geographical levels. Hence, if they have 
collaboration agreements with foreign units of the same corporate company, but not exclusively, the firms are exposed to the same 
benefits as from an external partner located abroad. A different approach has been followed for the organizational dimension. The 
cooperation with the same-group firms and the one with partners that are external to the corporate group implies very different 
coordination mechanisms, hence they cannot be placed on the same level. Indeed, in the case of cooperation with a firm in the same 
group, the coordination occurs under the same company, with perhaps the upper hierarchical levels orchestrating the cooperation 
and mediating possible conflicts. On the contrary, in the case of cooperation with external partners, the coordination is between 
separated legal entities that need to clarify all the terms of their cooperation to avoid opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, the cases 
when firms cooperate with a single type of national external partners and with firms in the same group at the national level only are 
not considered a multi-partnership cooperation, and they have been included in the categories national only+vertical only, national 
only+horizontal only, or national only+institutional only. Similarly, the cases in which firms cooperate with a single type of 
national external partners and with firms in the same group in foreign countries cannot be considered a case of multi-partnership, 
neither exclusively nationally nor internationally, and they have been included in the corresponding categories of national 
only+vertical only, national only+horizontal or national only+institutional only.    
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the definitions of the variables (Table A1) and the correlation matrix of the variables 
used in the second-stage equation (Table A2).  
4 Descriptive analysis 
What began as a financial crisis quickly morphed into a crisis in the real economy 
in late 2008, when many countries around the world started to slump into recession 
(Keeley and Love, 2010). Similarly to Hud and Hussinger (Hud and Hussinger, 2015) 
for Germany, we consider 2009 as the year of the beginning of the crisis, since 2009 is 
the first year with negative GDP growth in Spain, which returns to positive in 2014 
(European Commission, 2015).  
Table 1 provides an overview on the cooperation and innovation behaviour of 
firms in selected years. The total sample of firms based on our selection decreases over 
years. It ranges from 8438 firms in 2004 to 7510 in 2012, with a peak of 9705 in 2006. 
The number of innovative firms (i.e. which have product or/and process, and/or ongoing 
innovation) and cooperative innovative firms follow this trend. However, if we consider 
the shares of these two groups of firms, some differences emerge. The share of 
innovative firms on total sample firms is higher before the crisis than after. In 2008, the 
innovative firms were 6925 (i.e. 76.07% of total sample firms); in 2010 they were 6344 
and in 2012 they dropped to 4991, which account respectively for 76.78% and 66.46% 
of total sample firms. Instead, for the cooperative innovative firms, after a decreasing 
trend up to 2008 (i.e. from 37.77% in 2004 to 34.89% in 2008), this share increases 
during the crisis, up to 41.68% in 2012. Hence, despite both the absolute number of 
innovative and cooperative innovative firms, following the general pattern, have 
declined during the crisis, the ratio of cooperative innovators has actually increased, 
which signals that cooperative innovative firms have decreased at a slower pace than 
innovative.  
Table 1 – Number and share of firms by innovation and cooperation behaviour in 
selected years.  
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
  # Share # Share # Share # Share # Share 
Innovative firms* 6042 71.60 7647 78.79 6925 76.07 6344 76.78 4991 66.46 
Non-innovative 2396 28.40 2058 21.21 2178 23.93 1919 23.22 2519 33.54 
Total 8438 100 9705 100 9103 100 8263 100 7510 100 
Cooperative innovative 2282 37.77 2703 35.35 2416 34.89 2289 36.08 2080 41.68 
Non-cooperative innovative 3753 62.12 4944 64.65 4509 65.11 4055 63.92 2911 58.32 
Missing 7 0.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 6042 100 7647 100 6925 100 6344 100 4991 100 
* which have product or/and process, and/or ongoing innovation 
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Table 2 shows the number and share over total cooperative innovative firms by 
geography and type of partners in selected years. The share of firms that cooperate only 
with national partners decreased since 2006 in favour of firms doing only or also 
international agreements. However, exclusive national cooperation constitutes the 
majority (i.e. 61.79% in 2004 and 59.42% in 2012), while having at least an 
international partner account for 32.21% in 2004 and 40.58% in 2012.  We observe an 
internationalization process in the cooperation agreements carried out by Spanish firms.  
The distribution of firms across types of partners reflects that roughly half of 
firms have multi-partner strategies and that this trend is increasing. Firms seem to look 
for diverse knowledge that can be achieved thanks to cooperation with a variety of types 
of partnerships. In terms of share, it goes from 43.21% in 2004 to 50.29% in 2012. 
Among single-partner firms, firms collaborating only with institutions exhibit the 
highest percentage, with a decreasing trend during the crisis, from 29.45% in 2004 to 
20.72% in 2012. Firms collaborating only with vertical partners are the second largest 
group, which shows a quite stable trend, from 17.09% in 2004 to 17.26% in 2012, 
except for a peak of 20.46% in 2006. As third largest group, we find the firms 
collaborating with same-group firms, with an increasing trend. Finally, collaboration 
with competitors is the least frequent, and with a decreasing trend. 
By looking at the distribution across geography and partners, the patterns of firms 
collaborating exclusively with one type of partners are reproduced also at national and 
international level. Similarly, the multi-partner categories are among the largest group. 
Interestingly, in 2004 firms collaborating exclusively with national institutions or 
research centres were 24.93%, but it dropped to 18.94% in 2012 (i.e. the third largest 
category). These figures show that cooperative innovative firms purse a diversified 
strategy, both at national and international level, which has been reinforced during the 
crisis. Conversely, exclusive institutional alliances at the national level (which is a 
peculiar trait of Spanish NSI) (Belderbos et al., 2015) seems to lose ground during the 
crisis, probably for the reduction of public funding for incentivizing firms to maintain 
cooperation agreements with university and research centres.  
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Table 2 – Number and share of cooperative innovative firms by geographical 
location of partners and type of partners.  
  2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
  # Share # Share # Share # Share # Share 
Geography                     
National only 1410 61.79 1772 65.56 1526 63.16 1391 60.77 1236 59.42 
International 872 38.21 931 34.44 890 36.84 898 39.23 844 40.58 
Total 2282 100 2703 100 2416 100 2289 100 2080 100 
Partners                     
Same group only 150 6.57 154 5.70 125 5.17 97 4.24 188 9.04 
Vertical only 390 17.09 553 20.46 425 17.59 401 17.52 359 17.26 
Horizontal only 84 3.68 82 3.03 70 2.90 63 2.75 56 2.69 
Institutional only 672 29.45 780 28.86 681 28.19 606 26.47 431 20.72 
Multi-partners 986 43.21 1134 41.95 1115 46.15 1122 49.02 1046 50.29 
Total 2282 100 2703 100 2416 100 2289 100 2080 100 
Geography and partners                     
National only+same 
group only 98 4.29 102 3.77 70 2.90 53 2.32 112 5.38 
National only+vertical 
only 282 12.36 434 16.06 318 13.16 289 12.63 269 12.93 
National 
only+horizontal only 67 2.94 67 2.48 57 2.36 50 2.18 47 2.26 
National 
only+institution only 569 24.93 721 26.67 636 26.32 555 24.25 394 18.94 
National only+multi-
partners 434 19.02 502 18.57 497 20.57 487 21.28 456 21.92 
International+same 
group only 52 2.28 52 1.92 55 2.28 44 1.92 76 3.65 
International+vertical 
only 108 4.73 119 4.40 107 4.43 112 4.89 90 4.33 
International+horizontal 
only 17 0.74 15 0.55 13 0.54 13 0.57 9 0.43 
International+institution 
only 103 4.51 59 2.18 45 1.86 51 2.23 37 1.78 
International+multi-
partners 552 24.19 632 23.38 618 25.58 635 27.74 590 28.37 
Total 2282 100 2703 100 2416 100 2289 100 2080 100 
 
In Table 3, we use the balanced panel and compare the innovation performance for 
innovative, cooperative innovative and non-cooperative innovative firms in three 
different time frames (whole period, pre-crisis period, and during-crisis period)10, and 
with three different measures of innovation performance: the share of sales from new 
products, the share of sales from products new only to the firm (a proxy for products 
that incorporate an incremental innovation), and the share of sales from products new to 
the market (proxying for products incorporating a breakthrough innovation). 
Cooperative innovative firms have a higher innovation performance than non-
cooperative innovative firms, and this holds true both across time frames and across 
different measures of innovation performance. The share of sales from new products has 
                                                 
10 These time frames reflect the pre- and during-crisis periods considered in the estimations, as discussed in Section 3.2.   
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decreased during the crisis for all categories of firms suggesting that on average the 
crisis has affected innovation outputs of all firms. However, it seems that the share of 
sales from products incorporating a radical innovation was hit by the crisis to a lesser 
extent; indeed, the overall mean of the innovation performance of cooperative firms in 
the pre-crisis is 13.12% while during the crisis is 12.59%, namely about 0.5 points of 
change, the lowest variation across the different categories of firms and measures of 
innovation performances between pre- and during-crisis figures.  
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of the share of sales from new products by periods 
(balanced panel) 
  Whole period (2005-2013) Pre-crisis (2005-2010) During-crisis (2011-2013) 
  Over
all 
Mea
n 
Betw
een 
SD 
Wit
hin 
SD 
Medi
an 
Over
all 
Mea
n 
Betw
een 
SD 
Wit
hin 
SD 
Medi
an 
Over
all 
Mea
n 
Betw
een 
SD 
Wit
hin 
SD 
Medi
an 
  New products 
Innovative firms 26.3
2 
24.84 26.5
6 
9.00 27.0
9 
27.42 23.7
6 
10 24.5
3 
29.99 19.2
9 
5 
Cooperative 
innovative 
28.9
4 
29.71 23.2
9 
11.3
0 
29.5
7 
30.91 20.6
1 
13 27.6
5 
32.55 16.1
1 
10 
Non-cooperative 
innovative 
24.7
7 
27.47 25.3
6 
5.00 25.7
1 
29.86 22.5 5 22.4
4 
31.18 18.1
6 
2 
  New incremental-innovative products 
Innovative firms 15.6
6 
18.82 21.8
2 
1.00 16.0
4 
20.88 19.6
5 
1 14.7
8 
23.29 16 0 
Cooperative 
innovative 
15.9
9 
22.67 18.4
9 
3.00 16.4
4 
23.16 16.9
3 
4.2 15.0
6 
24.74 12.2
1 
2 
Non-cooperative 
innovative 
15.4
7 
21.29 21.2
7 
0.00 15.8
2 
23.22 18.8
1 
0.1 14.5
9 
24.79 15.7
4 
0 
  New radical-innovative products 
Innovative firms 10.6
5 
15.21 17.2
9 
0.00 11.0
4 
16.94 15.9 0 9.75 18.65 12.3
5 
0 
Cooperative 
innovative 
12.9
5 
19.27 16.5
6 
0.10 13.1
2 
20.61 14.7
8 
0.5 12.5
9 
21.43 11.9
8 
0 
Non-cooperative 
innovative 
9.30 16.75 15.8
3 
0.00 9.88 18.45 14.5
2 
0 7.84 18.71 10.6
8 
0 
 
Table 4 shows the innovation performance of cooperative firms which had R&D 
cooperation for the first time during the crisis, and cooperative firms which undertook 
R&D cooperation only before the crisis11, for the balanced panel. The figures are shown 
in the three time frames, and with three different measures of innovation performance, 
similarly than in Table 3. The overall mean of innovation performance is systematically 
lower during the crisis than before for both categories of firms and for the three 
measures of innovation performance. The decrease is less prominent for first-time 
                                                 
11 To keep overlapping years to the lowest, we do not consider 2009. 
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cooperative firms in the crisis, suggesting that the most recent cooperation behaviour 
during the turbulent time is more important than remote cooperation in expansion 
periods, and more strongly in the case of producing new radical-innovative products.   
Table 4 – Description of the share of sales of new products of first-time cooperative 
innovative firms in the during crisis period and cooperative innovative firms only 
before the crisis, by periods (balanced panel).  
 
 
5 Econometric results 
We firstly estimate the selection equation (the propensity to invest in innovation) 
for each year. Table A3 in the Appendix presents the results. From these estimations, 
we obtain the inverse Mill’s ratio which are subsequently included in the second stage. 
Inverse Mill’s ratios account for the selection bias caused by the fact that we only 
observe the innovation performance of firms that made an innovation investment. 
  Whole period (2005-2013) Pre-crisis (2004-2010) During-crisis (2011-2013) 
  
Overall 
Mean 
Between 
SD 
Within 
SD 
Median 
Overall 
Mean 
Between 
SD 
Within 
SD 
Median 
Overall 
Mean 
Between 
SD 
Within 
SD 
Median 
  New products 
First-time 
cooperative 
innovative in 
2010-2013 ( # 
655) 
25.84 23.14 27.67 7.50 26.33 26.68 24.30 10.00 24.89 30.22 20.24 5.00 
Cooperative 
innovative in 
2005-2008, not 
afterwards 
(#726) 
26.08 24.99 27.25 5.00 27.45 27.81 24.74 8.00 22.42 30.52 2.00 0.10 
  New incremental-innovative products 
First-time 
cooperative 
innovative in 
2010-2013 ( # 
655) 
14.93 17.4 21.99 0.5 15.2 20.5 19.25 0.8 14.39 23.1 16.25 0.1 
Cooperative 
innovative in 
2005-2008, not 
afterwards 
(#726) 
16.47 19.86 23.02 0.1 16.93 21.59 21.07 0.8 15.26 25.06 16.99 0 
  New radical-innovative products 
First-time 
cooperative 
innovative in 
2010-2013 ( # 
655) 
10.91 14.81 18.56 0 11.12 17.25 16.48 0 10.5 18.7 14.09 0 
Cooperative 
innovative in 
2005-2008, not 
afterwards 
(#726) 
9.6 14.62 17.45 0 10.51 16.65 16.65 0 7.16 18.47 10.68 0 
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Table 5 shows the estimation results of the second-stage model. For the whole 
period, we estimate the unbalanced panel where the dependent variable is the share of 
sales from new incremental-innovative products (model 1) and new radical-innovative 
products (model 2). The variable of interest cooperation is positive on both 
specifications, although statistically significant (p < 0.01) only for the radical innovation 
performance (model 2). In line with previous studies suggesting that R&D cooperation 
has a more important impact on highly innovative products (Amara and Landry, 2005; 
Nieto and Santamaría, 2007), we find that external technological collaboration has a 
considerable positive impact on the share of sales due to products new to the market, 
while such innovation strategy is negligible for the shares of sales due to products new 
to the firm. A possible reason for these different results is that in order to outweigh the 
costs of accessing to external knowledge not available inside the firms or through other 
means, such as knowledge spillovers or purchase of R&D services, the firms expect that 
the technological cooperation brings to breakthrough innovation. Accordingly, other 
sources of knowledge may be relevant for boosting the innovation sales of new 
incremental-innovative products. This empirical result is also in line with the idea that 
R&D cooperation is an explorative strategy that has more to do with discovering and 
risk-taking that would ensure some long-term returns (more likely in the case of radical 
innovation), and less to do with the mere reception of innovative products already 
present in the market which, although spurring innovation sales for those products, are 
not necessarily the results of an explorative strategy. For these reasons, we restrict our 
subsequent empirical analyses to the share of sales from new radical-innovative 
products.  
Model 3 in Table 5 shows the balanced panel for radical innovation performance. 
For the pre-crisis years and the during-crisis years, we run only the balanced panel 
(model 4 and 5, respectively) in order to have the same firms before and after the crisis, 
and therefore ensure comparability between the two estimations. Cooperation is 
positive and significant at p < 0.01 in all three specifications of the balanced panel. For 
the whole period, the coefficient is slightly higher for the unbalanced panel (model 2) 
than the balanced one (model 3). All the remaining controls are statistically significant 
and show the expected sign in the unbalanced panel, while new firm loses its 
significance in the balanced panel. In-house R&D intensity is positively correlated to 
innovation performance (Belderbos et al., 2015; Nieto and Santamaría, 2007). Size is 
negative and its squared term is positive, thus suggesting a non-linear relation between 
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size and performance (Badillo and Moreno, 2015; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). 
Firms that have carried out R&D continuously (permanent R&D) have better 
performance, as they have accumulated knowledge and implemented learning processes 
(Badillo and Moreno, 2015). Belonging to a foreign multinational has a positive effect 
on performance, suggesting that internationalization could help the firms to increase the 
relative sales of their innovative products (Belderbos et al., 2015; Duysters and Lokshin, 
2011). In line with previous studies, the degree of openness of the firm and the demand-
pull control have a positive impact on innovation performance (Belderbos et al., 2015; 
Duysters and Lokshin, 2011). Also in line with studies that detect the importance of 
export, the variable accounting for whether the firm serves international market is 
positive (Nieto and Santamaría, 2007), which reinforces the idea that 
internationalization boosts innovation productivity. The fact that the firm has been 
newly established at the beginning of the period under consideration positively affect 
innovation sales, but this control is not significant in the balanced panel, suggesting that 
survival innovative firms are long-established organizations. Finally, market share is 
also positive, suggesting that having a strong market position helps the firms to increase 
the benefits of their innovation efforts, as for example in terms of long-standing routines 
and competences to manage the transition from ideas to market (Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2004). 
In models 4 and 5 we observe that during the crisis the cooperation coefficient is 
about three times larger than in the pre-crisis years. We run a test of comparison of the 
cooperation coefficients for the balanced panel across the two time frames, and, as 
reported in the last row in Table 5, the test rejects the null hypothesis of equality at p < 
0.01. Hence, having cooperation agreements positively affects the innovation 
performance of Spanish firms during the crisis to a greater extent than before the crisis, 
suggesting that an explorative strategy increases the flows of knowledge not available 
inside the firms and that this external source of knowledge offers a way to increase sales 
from radical-innovative products during turbulent times.  
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Table 5 – The impact of R&D cooperation on innovation performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DV: Innovation sales Whole period 
(unbalanced)  
Incremental 
Whole period 
(unbalanced)  
Radical 
Whole period 
(balanced)  
Radical 
Pre-crisis 
(balanced) 
Radical 
During-crisis 
(balanced) 
Radical 
cooperation 0.052 0.466*** 0.384*** 0.247*** 0.710*** 
 (0.056) (0.046) (0.056) (0.069) (0.101) 
in-house R&D intensity 0.208 1.590*** 2.422*** 2.380*** 2.502*** 
 (0.141) (0.149) (0.276) (0.326) (0.444) 
size 0.181* -0.642*** -0.735*** -0.802*** -0.501*** 
 (0.096) (0.087) (0.112) (0.123) (0.191) 
size 2 -0.015 0.063*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.060*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) 
permanent R&D 0.176*** 1.096*** 1.104*** 1.052*** 1.223*** 
 (0.062) (0.054) (0.062) (0.072) (0.113) 
foreign -0.189** 0.191*** 0.237*** 0.300*** 0.084 
 (0.082) (0.073) (0.085) (0.098) (0.131) 
openness 0.110*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.107*** 0.095*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.021) 
demand-pull 0.824*** 1.195*** 1.123*** 1.175*** 1.040*** 
 (0.058) (0.049) (0.058) (0.069) (0.123) 
international market 0.137* 0.292*** 0.264*** 0.271*** 0.328** 
 (0.071) (0.061) (0.078) (0.089) (0.144) 
new firm 0.866*** 0.461*** 0.136 -0.002 0.448 
 (0.176) (0.152) (0.204) (0.259) (0.329) 
market share -2.104** 2.807*** 3.331*** 4.062*** 3.672** 
 (0.978) (0.973) (1.039) (1.497) (1.625) 
constant -5.782*** -9.483*** -9.533*** -8.406*** -8.458*** 
 (2.083) (0.683) (0.793) (0.806) (1.375) 
Observations 41,181 41,181 30,138 20,955 9,183 
R-squared 0.032 0.087 0.086 0.084 0.098 
Comparison test (balanced)a 
Cooperation 
 
β2005-2010=β2011-2013: χ2=16.86*** 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; industry dummies, inverse mills ratio and means-fixed 
effects are included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n.s. non-significant 
a Wald test on equality of coefficients in pooled estimations 
 
We now turn to explore the different impacts of cooperation before and during the 
crisis according to the geographical locations of the partners. Table 6 shows the 
estimations for the whole period with both the unbalanced (model 6) and the balanced 
panels (model 7), and for the latter in the pre-crisis (model 8) and the during-crisis years 
(model 9). In line with previous studies (Badillo and Moreno, 2015), both national only 
and international are positive and significant at p < 0.01 in the whole-period models.  
When we focus on the difference between the two periods, national only cooperation is 
unimportant before the crisis (the coefficient is small and non-significant), while it turns 
significant and larger during the crisis. Instead, the coefficient of international 
cooperation is significant both before and during the crisis, and larger during the crisis. 
The comparison tests reported in the bottom row in Table 6 show that these differences 
across periods are statistically significant for both types of cooperation (at p < 0.01). 
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These results suggest that during the crisis those firms that implemented an 
exploratory strategy in any geographical direction had a beneficial influence on their 
innovative outcomes. While firms did not benefit from national cooperation before the 
crisis, during the crisis they received some benefits from such exploratory strategy, even 
if confined to national borders. However, by looking at the coefficients of national only 
and international during the crisis (model 9), we can see that the benefits from 
collaborating with foreign partners are higher, as the impact of international alliances is 
almost double the size of exclusively national cooperation.   
Table 6 – R&D cooperation by geography 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DV: Radical innovation sales Whole period 
(unbalanced) 
Whole period 
(balanced) 
Pre-crisis 
(balanced) 
During-crisis 
(balanced) 
national only 0.304*** 0.235*** 0.132 0.500*** 
 (0.056) (0.064) (0.083) (0.114) 
international 0.760*** 0.644*** 0.458*** 1.046*** 
 (0.070) (0.075) (0.081) (0.136) 
in-house R&D intensity 1.531*** 2.326*** 2.306*** 2.358*** 
 (0.144) (0.274) (0.321) (0.452) 
size -0.654*** -0.743*** -0.810*** -0.503*** 
 (0.076) (0.112) (0.139) (0.188) 
size 2 0.063*** 0.074*** 0.079*** 0.058*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) 
permanent R&D 1.084*** 1.094*** 1.043*** 1.209*** 
 (0.050) (0.061) (0.075) (0.106) 
foreign 0.129** 0.179** 0.253** 0.005 
 (0.066) (0.076) (0.099) (0.138) 
openness 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.106*** 0.090*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.021) 
demand-pull 1.184*** 1.114*** 1.170*** 1.017*** 
 (0.051) (0.058) (0.070) (0.121) 
international market 0.270*** 0.246*** 0.259*** 0.296** 
 (0.064) (0.077) (0.090) (0.141) 
new firm 0.456*** 0.127 -0.004 0.418 
 (0.135) (0.185) (0.251) (0.307) 
market share 2.609*** 3.182*** 3.873*** 3.542** 
 (0.965) (1.118) (1.497) (1.740) 
constant -9.303*** -9.386*** -8.314*** -7.915*** 
 (0.723) (0.762) (0.881) (1.436) 
Observations 41,181 30,138 20,955 9,183 
R-squared 0.088 0.086 0.084 0.099 
Comparison testa  
national only  
international 
 
β2005-2010 =β2011-2013: χ2=7.27*** 
β2005-2010 =β2011-2013: χ2=13.24*** 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; industry dummies, inverse mills ratio and means-fixed 
effects are included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n.s. non-significant 
a Wald test on equality of coefficients in pooled estimations 
 
We report the estimates on the impact of cooperation by geography and type of 
partners in Table 7, for the whole period with both the unbalanced and balanced panels 
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(models 10 and 11, respectively), and for the pre-crisis and the during-crisis years 
(models 12 and 13) for the balanced panel. As far as the before- and during-crisis 
periods are concerned (models 12-13), the cooperation coefficients that are positive and 
significant in both periods are systematically higher during the crisis than before (i.e. 
national only+multi-partners, international+vertical only, and international+multi-
partners) and some others become significant during the crisis (i.e. national 
only+vertical only, national only+institutional only, and international+institutional 
only).  
The bottom rows in Table 7 show the tests of equality of the cooperation 
parameters in both periods, suggesting that all the above-mentioned coefficients in the 
during-crisis years are statistically significantly higher than before the crisis. In 
particular, the tests for the multi-partner variables reject the null hypothesis of the 
equality of coefficients before and during the crisis, both at the national (p < 0.10) and 
international (p < 0.01) level. This suggests that relying on multiple types of sources is 
beneficial to firms, especially if these partners are also international. In this case, firms 
could benefit from the combination of organizational and geographical diversity, as they 
are able to access to specialized knowledge of different partners, as well as to the 
different knowledge base of the foreign NSI of their partners.  
The coefficient of national only+institutional only, which is positive and 
statistically significant during the crisis (p < 0.01) and not before, is significant in the 
comparison test (p < 0.05). Not surprisingly it is the result for the test of the coefficient 
of international+institutional only (p < 0.01), which in the estimates turns from slightly 
significant and negative before the crisis to positive and significant at p < 0.05 during 
the crisis. These results suggest that the firms which successfully managed to access to 
institutional partners received remarkable benefits, even though this was the only type 
of partners, either nationally or internationally (Arranz et al., 2008).  
For international+vertical only, which was positive and significant before and 
during the crisis, the test detects a marginally statistically significant difference in the 
two periods (p < 0.10), the same as for the test for the coefficient of national 
only+vertical only (significant at p < 0.05), although being positive and significant only 
in the during-crisis estimations. These results about vertical partners point out that 
value-chain connections (i.e. clients and suppliers) are always important sources of 
knowledge for innovative products at the international, although its impact on 
innovation performance increases during the crisis; instead, at the national level these 
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collaborations are particularly important during a crisis, suggesting that in turbulent 
periods the vertical linkages, even if it is the only cooperation, turns out to pay off also 
within the national borders. Finally, for horizontal cooperation, for which the 
coefficients are not significant, the comparison tests do not suggest any significant 
change during the crisis.  
Table 7– R&D cooperation by geography and type of partners  
DV: Radical innovation sales (10) Whole 
period 
(unbalanced) 
(11) Whole 
period (balanced) 
(12) Pre-crisis 
(balanced) 
(13) During-
crisis (balanced) 
national only+vertical only 0.007 0.114 -0.048 0.496** 
 (0.104) (0.114) (0.140) (0.221) 
national only+horizontal only 0.061 0.137 0.348 -0.161 
 (0.187) (0.256) (0.327) (0.356) 
national only+institutional only 0.254*** 0.208** 0.088 0.492*** 
 (0.081) (0.093) (0.109) (0.162) 
national only+multi-partners 0.635*** 0.460*** 0.348*** 0.757*** 
 (0.086) (0.099) (0.105) (0.173) 
international+vertical only 0.482*** 0.593*** 0.385* 1.021*** 
 (0.158) (0.180) (0.199) (0.307) 
international+horizontal only 0.138 0.173 -0.129 1.038 
 (0.466) (0.530) (0.559) (1.030) 
international+institutional only 0.362* 0.215 -0.123 1.010** 
 (0.219) (0.245) (0.295) (0.484) 
international+multi-partners 0.905*** 0.761*** 0.592*** 1.130*** 
 (0.076) (0.080) (0.109) (0.144) 
same group only 0.301* 0.001 0.037 0.034 
 (0.158) (0.186) (0.215) (0.292) 
in-house R&D intensity 1.491*** 2.288*** 2.269*** 2.317*** 
 (0.148) (0.266) (0.302) (0.432) 
size -0.647*** -0.733*** -0.798*** -0.490*** 
 (0.084) (0.111) (0.135) (0.189) 
size 2 0.061*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.057*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) 
permanent R&D 1.069*** 1.083*** 1.033*** 1.192*** 
 (0.054) (0.057) (0.076) (0.111) 
foreign 0.193*** 0.243*** 0.302*** 0.102 
 (0.068) (0.078) (0.098) (0.131) 
openness 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.101*** 0.084*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) 
demand-pull 1.181*** 1.110*** 1.166*** 1.014*** 
 (0.054) (0.061) (0.069) (0.110) 
international market 0.267*** 0.244*** 0.258*** 0.295** 
 (0.066) (0.072) (0.096) (0.147) 
new firm 0.449*** 0.132 0.008 0.411 
 (0.148) (0.192) (0.224) (0.309) 
market share 2.557*** 3.150*** 3.846*** 3.499** 
 (0.974) (1.199) (1.446) (1.652) 
constant -9.189*** -9.315*** -8.201*** -7.518*** 
 (0.768) (0.891) (0.834) (1.488) 
Observations 41,181 30,138 20,955 9,183 
R-squared 0.089 0.087 0.085 0.100 
Comparison testa 
national only+vertical only 
national only+horizontal only 
national only+institutional only 
national only+multi-partners 
international+vertical only 
international+horizontal only 
international+institutional only 
international+multi-partners 
 
β2005-2010 =β2011-2013: χ2=4.27** 
β2005-2010 =β2011-2013: χ2=1.02 n.s.. 
β2005-2010 =β2011-2013: χ2=4.12** 
β2005-2010 =β2011-2013: χ2=4.54* 
β2005-2010 =β2011-2013: χ2=2.81* 
β2005-2010 =β2011-2013: χ2=0.84 n.s. 
β2005-2010 =β2011-2013: χ2=3.56** 
β2005-2010 =β2011-2013: χ2=10.04*** 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; industry dummies, inverse mills ratio and means-fixed 
 25 
 
effects are included.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 , n.s. non-significant. 
a Wald test on equality of coefficients in pooled estimations 
 
Finally, we estimate how past experience in R&D cooperation helps the firms to 
face the crisis. Table 8 shows the estimations for the balanced panel during the crisis, in 
which we introduced a variable for continuity in R&D collaboration (continuity) that 
accounts for the total years of collaboration up to t-1 (model 14). The coefficient is 
positive and significant at p < 0.01, suggesting that cumulative past experience 
determines the current innovation performance of firms during the crisis (Nieto and 
Santamaría, 2007). To explicitly test whether the most recent R&D cooperation matters 
more than remote alliances, and whether the combination of cooperative behaviour 
under different business climates increases innovation performance during recession, 
model 15 in Table 8 shows the estimation in which we introduced three dummy 
variables accounting for whether the firm has collaborated only in t-1 (during-crisis 
cooperation), or only before 2008 (before-crisis cooperation), or both in t-1 and before 
2008 (persistent cooperation). Results show that newly-cooperative firms in the 
recession perform well (coefficient is positive and significant at p < 0.01), while 
experience in the expansion period does not have a statistically significant effect on 
innovation performance during the crisis, which reinforces the idea that what matters is 
the most recent cooperation behaviour. However, a combination of past experience in 
the current business climate and in the previous expansion period (persistent 
cooperation) exhibits a higher coefficient than that of the during-crisis cooperation, 
which signals that the combination of past acquired knowledge and current external 
knowledge boosts innovation performance during recessions. Indeed, the recent 
experience offers the most valuable knowledge, but the firms that have followed an 
explorative strategy under different business climates gain from such knowledge 
diversity. The external knowledge acquired during a certain period becomes part of the 
current knowledge stock of firms, hence the combination of past and current external 
knowledge inspires new innovative ideas (Kogut and Zander, 1992) and leads to higher 
innovation performance than in the case of cooperative agreements undertaken only 
before or only during the crisis. 
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Table 8 – The impact of experience in R&D cooperation on innovation 
performance in the during-crisis period (2011-13), balanced panel 
 
 (14) (15) 
DV: Radical innovation sales During crisis 
(Balanced) 
During crisis 
(Balanced) 
continuity 0.087***  
 (0.017)  
during-crisis cooperation  0.889*** 
  (0.200) 
before-crisis cooperation  0.088 
  (0.138) 
persistent cooperation  0.888*** 
  (0.130) 
in-house R&D intensity 2.541*** 2.382*** 
 (0.467) (0.459) 
size -0.466** -0.733*** 
 (0.194) (0.238) 
size 2 0.057*** 0.086*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) 
permanent R&D 1.213*** 1.239*** 
 (0.105) (0.112) 
foreign 0.083 0.120 
 (0.135) (0.137) 
openness 0.100*** 0.093*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) 
demand-pull 1.068*** 1.060*** 
 (0.112) (0.128) 
international market 0.337** 0.290** 
 (0.149) (0.147) 
new firm 0.402 0.401 
 (0.339) (0.327) 
market share 3.675** 1.337 
 (1.682) (1.576) 
Constant -8.174*** -9.526*** 
 (1.504) (0.974) 
Observations 9,183 8,129 
R-squared 0.095 0.106 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; industry dummies, inverse mills ratio and means-fixed 
effects are included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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6 Conclusions 
During the recent economic recession, firms have been less willing to invest in 
innovation. Technological collaboration has followed a similar pattern, as the absolute 
number of cooperating firms has decreased during the crisis. However, since a group of 
firms managed to conduct R&D alliances during the crisis, in this study, we have 
investigated how the last economic recession shaped the role of R&D collaboration on 
innovation performance.  
Our findings point out that R&D cooperation has been successful to boost 
innovation performance during the last recession, as part of an exploratory strategy 
aimed at accessing knowledge not available inside the firms and increasing diversity of 
knowledge sources (March, 1991). These positive effects are higher during the crisis 
than before every time the cooperation involves an increased diversity of knowledge 
sources (national vs international cooperation, with multiple partners, and under 
different business climates). Also, cooperation turns important in cases which were 
irrelevant before the crisis, reinforcing the idea that R&D cooperation is a mechanism to 
deal with economic turbulence.  
In particular, as far as the geographical dimension is concerned, we find that the 
positive effect on innovation performance is stronger during the crisis than before in 
both cases analysed, that is when firms cooperate with national partners only and when 
they are from abroad. Exclusively national cooperation was an unimportant factor 
before the crisis and its increased relevance during an economic turmoil points out that 
during a crisis firms are searching for external knowledge in any direction, 
irrespectively of the geographical locations. Indeed, not all firms are equipped to 
undertake international alliances but the ones that explore within national borders were 
able to boost innovation performance in a more intense way that firms non-cooperating. 
In line with previous studies, in any period considered, international R&D cooperation 
has a higher impact than national, as international partners provide access to 
heterogeneous sources of knowledge and to frontier-technological inputs (Duysters and 
Lokshin, 2011).  
Regarding the organizational dimension, we find that when the firm cooperates 
with a variety of partners (organizational diversity), there is outstanding evidence of a 
stronger effect on innovation performance during the crisis than before. This effect is 
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magnified when the diversity is at the maximum, i.e. when the variety of partners 
includes at least an international tie. In addition, we find that some types of cooperation 
have become important factors for innovation performance during the crisis, while they 
were unimportant before. This is the case of cooperating only with institutional partners, 
either nationally or internationally, which reinforces the importance of research 
organizations to support firms (Schwartz et al., 2012), especially during turbulent times. 
We also find that the exclusive cooperation with international vertical partners has a 
strong effect in any business climate but it still increases during a crisis, while at the 
national level, vertical cooperation has a weak impact before the crisis which becomes 
higher during the crisis, suggesting that this exploration strategy in any direction is 
beneficial, even if it is the only type and within national borders. This result is in the 
line with the general finding that cooperation with national partners turns significant 
during the crisis, but not before. Finally, horizontal cooperation does not have a 
significant effect on innovation performance.  
Finally, we explore the role of past experiences in R&D agreements (Belderbos et 
al., 2015; Nieto and Santamaría, 2007) in the innovation performance during the crisis 
and we find that continuity in R&D cooperation has a positive impact. We also find that 
more recent R&D collaboration during the crisis has a positive effect, while remote 
alliances before the crisis are unimportant. However, if firms have experience in both 
business climates, then the combinative capabilities resulting from these R&D 
collaborations have the highest impact on innovation performance, suggesting that also 
inter-temporal knowledge diversity is an important factor during the crisis.   
Our findings provide useful managerial implications. When facing the challenges 
of a crisis, an exploration strategy such as R&D collaboration helps the firm to maintain 
a certain degree of innovation by increasing the sources and variety of knowledge. 
Technological and market turbulence causes ideas and products to go obsolete very 
weakly (Hung and Chou, 2013), and during a crisis the combinations of new external 
and existing internal knowledge amplify the opportunities to create new successful 
products. Managers should search for these opportunities in international collaborations 
and with a variety of national or international partners, not only because multi-partner 
collaborations have the highest impact on innovation performance in general, but also 
because they turn to be more important during an economic turmoil. In some cases, 
firms may not have the capabilities or resources to have a large spectrum of 
collaborations, and our findings suggest that during the crisis even the types of 
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collaborations whose impact is negligible during expansions could boost innovation 
sales during crises. Hence, managers should consider applying an exploration strategy 
in any direction, being aware than international and multi-partner cooperation ensures 
the highest innovative performance.  
We believe that our findings bear some suggestions for policy-makers. Especially 
during the last economic crisis which started as a financial crisis and had repercussions 
on the sovereignty debts, many governments undertook dramatic cuts on R&D budgets, 
like in Spain (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menéndez, 2015). Other countries, under less 
stringent financial pressure, have implemented policies to support private R&D 
investments, such as the R&D subsidies provided by the German government to 
compensate the reduction of private R&D (Hud and Hussinger, 2015). Our study 
suggests that R&D cooperation during a crisis should be promoted by governments. In 
contrast to other R&D public support (subsidies, direct R&D funding), policies in 
favour of R&D collaboration could be designed even under a lack of public financial 
resources. They can take the forms of tax exemptions for firms that undertake 
technological agreements, or collection of information and best practices to be passed 
on to firms in fairs, consortia, technological parks or industrial associations to reduce 
search costs of alliances and facilitate perfect match between partners.  
Our study is not without limitations. Our findings may be specific to the data on 
Spanish firms. Indeed, Filippetti and Archibugi (2011) observe that the recent economic 
crisis had an effect on the innovation investments that vary across countries. Future 
works should examine the impact of R&D cooperation on innovation performance 
across business cycles in other countries to assess the generalization of our results. 
Another limitation relates to the fact that we do not have details on the individual 
collaborations at the individual partner level, such as information on the start and end of 
the collaboration, the number of partners in each category, or whether they are new 
partners or not. Hence, future research should be devoted to collect and analyse the 
cooperation patterns of firms under different business climates at the ‘dyadic’ 
collaboration level (Belderbos et al., 2015). 
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Appendix 
A1 – Description of variables 
Variables Description  
Dependent variables   
Innovation 1 if the firm has carried out any of these innovation activities: internal R&D; 
external R&D, acquisition of machinery, equipment and software; acquisition of 
other external knowledge; training; market introduction of innovations; other 
preparations. 
Radical innovation performance Share of sales of new or significantly improved products new to the market (log[new 
sales/(1-new sales)]) 
Incremental innovation 
performance 
Share of sales of new or significantly improved products new to the firm (log[new 
sales/(1-new sales)]) 
Independent variables   
cooperation Any type of R&D cooperation in the previous three years (1-year lag) 
national only R&D cooperation only with national partners (1-year lag) 
international R&D cooperation with international partners (1-year lag) 
national only+vertical only R&D cooperation only with national vertical partners (1-year lag) 
national only+horizontal only R&D cooperation only with national horizontal partners (1-year lag) 
national only+institutional only R&D cooperation only with national institutional partners (1-year lag) 
national only+multi-partners R&D cooperation with at least two national partners not from the same group (1-
year lag) 
international+ vertical only R&D cooperation only with vertical partners of which at least 1 is international (1-
year lag) 
international+horizontal only R&D cooperation only with horizontal partners of which at least 1 is international 
(1-year lag) 
international+institutional only R&D cooperation only with institutional partners of which at least 1 is international 
(1-year lag) 
international+multi-partners R&D cooperation with any partners (not from the same group) of which at least 1 is 
international (1-year lag) 
same group only R&D cooperation only with partner from the same group (either national or 
international) (1-year lag) 
continuity Number of years up to t-1 in which the firm has declared any R&D cooperation  
persistent cooperation If the firm has declared any R&D collaboration in 2005-2008, and in t-1 
after crisis cooperation If the firm has not declared any R&D collaboration in 2005-2008, and it has in t-1 
before crisis cooperation If the firm has declared any R&D collaboration in 2005-2008, and not in t-1 
size Logarithm of number of employees (1-year lag) 
size 2 Logarithm of number of employees (squared) (1-year lag) 
market share Ratio of the sales of a firm over the total sales of the two-digit industry it belongs to 
(1-year lag) 
in-house intensity Ratio between intramural R&D expenditure and turnover (1-year lag) 
foreign 1 if the headquarter of the firm is outside Spain and it has at least a 50% of foreign 
capital (1-year lag) 
permanent R&D 1 if the firm reported that it performed internal R&D continuously (1-year lag) 
openness Number of information sources for innovations that the firm had used in the 
previous three years (from within the firm or group, suppliers, clients, competitors, 
private R&D institutions, conferences, scientific reviews or professional 
associations) (1-year lag) 
demand-pull 1 if at least one of the following demand-enhancing objectives for the firm’s 
innovations in the previous three years is given the highest score [number between 1 
(not important) and 4 (very important)]: extend product range; increase market or 
market share; improve quality in goods and services (1-year lag) 
international market 1 if the firm has sold its products in markets other than local or national in the 
previous three years (1-year lag)  
new firm 1 if the firm was newly created in anytime during the survey year or in the previous 
two years (survey year considered are 2004 and 2005) 
cost obstacles Sum of the scores of importance that the firm attributed [number between 1 (not 
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important) and 4 (very important)] to the following factors that hampered its 
innovation activities in the previous three years: lack of funds within the enterprise 
or enterprise group; lack of finance from sources outside the enterprise; innovation 
costs too high. Rescaled from 0 (unimportant) to 1 (crucial) (1-year lag) 
knowledge obstacles Sum of the scores of importance that the firm attributed [number between 1 (not 
important) and 4 (very important)] to the following factors that hampered its 
innovation activities in the previous three years: lack of qualified personnel; lack of 
information on technology; lack of information on markets; difficulty in finding 
cooperation partners for innovation. Rescaled from 0 (unimportant) to 1 (crucial) (1-
year lag) 
market obstacles Sum of the scores of importance that the firm attributed [number between 1 (not 
important) and 4 (very important)] to the following factors that hampered its 
innovation activities in the previous three years: markets dominated by established 
enterprises; uncertain demand for innovative goods or services. Rescaled from 0 
(unimportant) to 1 (crucial) (1-year lag) 
other obstacles Sum of the scores of importance that the firm attributed [number between 1 (not 
important) and 4 (very important)] to the following factors that hampered its 
innovation activities in the previous three years: not necessary due to previous 
innovations; not necessary due to the absence of demand. Rescaled from 0 
(unimportant) to 1 (crucial) (1-year lag) 
group 1 if the firm belongs to a group of enterprises (1-year lag) 
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A2 – Correlation table (unbalanced panel) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 cooperation 
1 
             
              
2 national only 
0.720 1 
            
*** 
             
3 international 
0.521 -0.152 1 
           
*** *** 
            
4 national only+vertical only 
0.299 0.397 -0.027 1 
          
*** *** *** 
           
5 national only+horizontal only 
0.126 0.178 -0.023 -0.016 1 
         
*** *** *** *** 
          
6 national only+institutional only 
0.417 0.562 -0.052 -0.052 -0.022 1 
        
*** *** *** *** *** 
         
7 national only+multi-partners 
0.375 0.534 -0.081 -0.047 -0.020 -0.065 1 
       
*** *** *** *** *** *** 
        
8 international+vertical only 
0.170 -0.050 0.331 -0.021 -0.009 -0.030 -0.027 1 
      
*** *** *** *** ** *** *** 
       
9 international+horizontal only 
0.058 -0.017 0.114 -0.007 -0.003 -0.010 -0.009 -0.004 1 
     
*** *** *** **   *** **   
      
10 international+institutional only 
0.123 -0.036 0.240 -0.015 -0.006 -0.021 -0.019 -0.009 -0.003 1 
    
*** *** *** *** * *** *** **   
     
11 international+multi-partners 
0.422 -0.124 0.814 -0.053 -0.022 -0.073 -0.066 -0.030 -0.010 -0.022 1 
   
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
    
12 same group only 
0.195 0.146 0.124 -0.024 -0.010 -0.034 -0.031 -0.014 -0.004 -0.010 -0.034 1 
  
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***   *** *** 
   
13 continuity 
0.620 0.414 0.432 0.147 0.055 0.241 0.269 0.109 0.030 0.075 0.391 0.102 1 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
  
14 persistent cooperation 
0.952 0.681 0.515 0.274 0.121 0.403 0.360 0.161 0.052 0.122 0.424 0.176 0.636 1 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
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 [cont.] 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
15 
after crisis 
cooperation 
0.190 0.175 0.064 0.106 0.029 0.078 0.075 0.048 0.030 0.011 0.026 0.081 0.010 -0.101 1 
          
 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** *** 
           
 
16 
before crisis 
cooperation 
-0.47 -0.286 -0.208 -0.119 -0.050 -0.166 -0.149 -0.068 -0.023 -0.049 -0.168 -0.078 0.032 -0.378 -0.078 1 
         
 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
          
 
17 
in-house R&D 
intensity 
0.151 0.075 0.191 -0.007 0.004 0.038 0.085 -0.007 0.007 0.043 0.220 -0.008 0.182 0.183 -0.003 -0.029 1 
        
 *** *** *** **   *** *** ** ** *** *** ** *** ***   *** 
         
 
18 size 
0.112 -0.034 0.110 0.007 -0.007 -0.056 0.002 0.022 -0.010 0.004 0.092 0.058 0.043 0.111 0.030 -0.004 -0.153 1 
       
 *** *** *** ** ** ***   *** ***   *** *** *** *** ***   *** 
        
 
19 size 2 
0.114 -0.031 0.107 0.007 -0.005 -0.057 0.007 0.021 -0.010 0.002 0.091 0.055 0.042 0.110 0.029 -0.009 -0.139 0.981 1 
      
 *** *** ** **   *** * *** ***   *** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** 
       
 
20 permanent R&D 
0.230 0.198 0.280 0.021 0.026 0.132 0.159 0.059 0.030 0.069 0.261 0.026 0.310 0.311 0.011 0.014 0.265 -0.048 -0.056 1 
     
 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
      
 
21 foreign 
0.030 -0.076 0.135 0.006 -0.017 -0.025 -0.052 0.040 -0.005 0.010 0.053 0.097 0.035 0.041 0.013 0.016 -0.063 0.254 0.242 0.003 1 
    
 *** *** * * *** *** *** ***   *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***   
     
 
22 openness 
0.229 0.111 0.196 -0.017 0.007 0.055 0.128 0.017 0.008 0.023 0.210 -0.004 0.243 0.231 0.017 -0.057 0.091 0.055 0.052 0.220 -0.009 1 
   
 *** *** ***     *** *** *** * *** ***   *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** 
    
 
23 demand-pull 
0.124 0.053 0.106 0.011 0.007 0.016 0.058 0.032 0.011 0.003 0.106 -0.003 0.143 0.119 0.031 -0.042 0.032 -0.024 -0.023 0.126 -0.005 0.263 1 
  
 *** *** ** ** *** *** *** *** **   ***   *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***   *** 
   
 
24 
international 
market 
0.055 0.038 0.151 -0.003 -0.006 0.050 0.021 0.050 0.009 0.031 0.124 0.029 0.160 0.097 0.023 0.040 -0.007 -0.027 -0.056 0.255 0.140 0.098 0.067 1 
 
 *** *** *** * * *** *** ** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
  
 
25 new firm 
0.051 0.037 0.048 0.003 -0.004 0.024 0.029 0.001 -0.004 0.013 0.057 -0.001 0.069 0.049 -0.004 -0.011 0.208 -0.111 -0.097 0.065 -0.033 0.027 0.033 -0.038 1 
 *** ***     *** ***     *** *** ***   *** ***   *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
 
26 market share 
0.064 -0.005 0.105 0.002 -0.004 -0.019 0.008 0.026 -0.004 0.005 0.098 0.034 0.075 0.067 0.029 -0.002 -0.031 0.316 0.347 0.044 0.131 0.042 0.011 0.058 -0.012 1 
  *** ***     ** **     *** *** *** *** *** ***   *** *** *** *** *** *** ** *** ***   
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A3 – Estimation first-stage model (unbalanced panel) 
DV: Innovation  Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 Year 2011 Year 2012 Year 2013 
Size 0.039 0.045 0.105* 0.186*** 0.174*** 0.181*** 0.212*** 0.261*** 0.212*** 
 
(0.060) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055)    (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.060) (0.061)    
Size 2 -0.006 -0.006 -0.011* -0.015*** -0.011* -0.011* -0.010* -0.015** -0.009    
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Cost obstacles 0.339*** 0.428*** 0.490*** 0.514*** 0.480*** 0.294*** 0.282*** 0.260*** 0.267*** 
 
(0.065) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060)    (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062)    
Market obstacles 0.517*** 0.333*** 0.230*** 0.373*** 0.324*** 0.366*** 0.387*** 0.392*** 0.489*** 
 
(0.068) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062)    (0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.065) (0.068)    
Knowledge obstacles 0.257*** 0.393*** 0.414*** 0.412*** 0.361*** 0.542*** 0.510*** 0.521*** 0.527*** 
 
(0.086) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078)    (0.080) (0.081) (0.082) (0.084) (0.087)    
Other obstacles -1.266*** -1.308*** -1.260*** -1.263*** -1.324*** -1.402*** -1.305*** -1.442*** -1.410*** 
 
(0.059) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055)    (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.061) (0.064)    
Market share 3.198*** 4.658*** 5.894*** 10.176*** 7.160*** 6.387*** 4.967*** 5.095*** 3.261*** 
 
(0.837) (1.000) (1.100) (1.224)    (1.142) (1.070) (0.955) (0.982) (0.780)    
Group 0.163*** 0.100*** 0.158*** 0.178*** 0.141*** 0.160*** 0.137*** 0.118*** 0.180*** 
 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)    (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)    
Constant -0.248 -0.212 -0.413*** -0.842*** -0.861*** -0.862*** -1.184*** -1.309*** -1.291*** 
  (0.151) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137)    (0.145) (0.145) (0.149) (0.153) (0.156)    
Obs. 8028.00 9561.00 9277.00 9039.00    8561.00 8195.00 7822.00 7453.00 7093.00    
Log L -4166.32 -4851.35 -4924.12 -4920.26    -4727.58 -4529.60 -4459.17 -4177.13 -3961.70    
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19    0.18 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.19    
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